75. Temptation, Self-Control, and Consumption#

75.1. Overview#

Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] construct recursive preferences for a consumer who is tempted to consume immediately and who can resist the temptation at a cost.

A literature that starts with Strotz [1956] and includes Phelps and Pollak [1968] and Laibson [1997] models such a consumer as a sequence of selves whose preferences differ.

The self at date \(t\) discounts date \(t+1\) more heavily, relative to date \(t\), than the self at date \(t-1\) wants it to, so the self at date \(t-1\) would like to restrict the choices of the self at date \(t\).

The consumer’s behavior is then an equilibrium of a game among the selves.

Gul and Pesendorfer instead posit a single preference relation that does not change over time.

Its domain is the set of decision problems, the sets of options from which the consumer will later choose.

Their consumer can strictly prefer a smaller set of options to a larger one, because the larger set contains a temptation.

The consumer’s welfare depends both on what it chooses and on what it could have chosen.

For a consumer who has wealth \(b\) and earns a gross return \(R\) on savings, Gul and Pesendorfer’s preferences take the form

\[ W(b) = \max_{0 \le c \le b} \left\{ u(c) + v(c) + \delta W(R(b - c)) \right\} - v(b) , \]

where \(\delta \in (0, 1)\) is a discount factor, \(u\) is a commitment utility, \(v\) is a temptation utility, and \(v(b)\) is the temptation utility of consuming all wealth at once.

Gul and Pesendorfer build on two papers by David Kreps.

Kreps [1979] studies preferences over menus and represents a decision maker who values flexibility as if it were uncertain about its future tastes.

Kreps [1992] interprets that subjective uncertainty as uncertainty about contingencies that the decision maker cannot foresee.

Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] keep Kreps’s domain of menus, with lotteries as the elements of menus, and replace his preference for flexibility with an axiom that allows a preference for commitment and rules out a strict preference for flexibility.

Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] extend their two-period analysis to infinite-horizon consumption problems.

The two approaches to temptation differ in how many Bellman equations they require.

The \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer of Laibson [1997] discounts utility at date \(t + j\) by \(\beta \delta^j\) for \(j \ge 1\), with \(0 < \beta \le 1\) and \(0 < \delta < 1\).

Its current self maximizes an objective that contains a continuation value; that continuation value satisfies a Bellman equation of its own, evaluated under the decision rule that every self uses.

Time Inconsistency of Ramsey Plans nicknames this structure dynamic programming squared.

The Gul–Pesendorfer consumer solves a single Bellman equation.

Gul and Pesendorfer write:

The recursive structure of our model allows us to apply standard techniques of dynamic programming to find optimal solutions.

This lecture

  • describes Kreps’s preferences over menus, his representation theorem, and his interpretation of it in terms of unforeseen contingencies,

  • describes the Gul–Pesendorfer representation of temptation and self-control in two-period and infinite-horizon decision problems,

  • describes how a Gul–Pesendorfer consumer can exhibit the preference reversals observed in experiments,

  • solves a consumption-savings problem for a Gul–Pesendorfer consumer by value function iteration,

  • solves the same problem for a \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer by iterating on two Bellman equations, and

  • describes the implications that Gul and Pesendorfer derive for steady-state wealth distributions, efficiency, asset prices, and sovereign debt.

We use the following imports.

import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from collections import namedtuple
from itertools import combinations
from scipy.interpolate import CubicSpline

75.2. Preferences over menus#

75.2.1. Preference for flexibility#

Kreps [1979] studies a decision maker who chooses a restaurant today and a meal from the restaurant’s menu later.

Let \(Z\) be a finite set of meals, and let \(X\), with typical element \(x\), be the set of nonempty subsets of \(Z\), the menus.

A decision maker who knows today which meal it will prefer later evaluates a menu by its best element.

Such a decision maker ranks menus by a preference \(\succsim\) that satisfies

(75.1)#\[x \succsim x' \implies x \sim x \cup x' .\]

Kreps studies preferences that satisfy a preference for flexibility,

(75.2)#\[x \supseteq x' \implies x \succsim x' ,\]

but that can rank \(x \cup x'\) strictly above both \(x\) and \(x'\), which (75.1) rules out.

Kreps describes an example:

Suppose that the individual prefers a menu containing only steak to one containing only chicken. But he strictly prefers a menu with both steak and chicken to either of the first two, because it gives him greater flexibility.

He attributes such preferences to “uncertainty about future tastes.”

He represents them by a finite set \(S\) of subjective states and a state-dependent utility function \(U : Z \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\), so that the value of a menu is

(75.3)#\[\Phi(x) = \sum_{s \in S} \max_{z \in x} U(z, s) .\]

In each state \(s\), the decision maker gets the best meal on the menu for that state; the value of the menu adds these maximal utilities across states.

Kreps also writes the representation with subjective probabilities of the states; multiplying \(U(\cdot, s)\) by the probability of \(s\) absorbs them into \(U\).

The representation (75.3) implies (75.2) and a second property:

(75.4)#\[x \sim x \cup x' \implies x \cup x'' \sim x \cup x' \cup x'' \text{ for all } x'' .\]

If adding \(x'\) to \(x\) adds no value, adding \(x'\) to the larger menu \(x \cup x''\) adds no value either.

Kreps’s Theorem 1 states that these properties characterize the representation.

Theorem (Preference for flexibility)

Let \(Z\) be finite.

A binary relation \(\succsim\) on \(X\) is complete and transitive and satisfies (75.2) and (75.4) if and only if there exist a finite set \(S\) and a function \(U : Z \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) such that \(\Phi\) in (75.3) represents \(\succsim\).

Kreps’s Theorem 1′ states the same result in ordinal form: the value of a menu is a strictly increasing function, not necessarily a sum, of the vector of maximal utilities \(\max_{z \in x} U(z, s)\) across states.

Kreps calls his approach “exclusively descriptive.”

The states and the function \(U\) rationalize the ranking of menus, but the decision maker need not think in terms of them, and many different pairs \((S, U)\) represent the same ranking.

The next cell computes the values of three menus in Kreps’s steak-and-chicken example, with probability \(0.9\) on a state in which the decision maker prefers steak.

def menu_value(menu, π, U):
    "Kreps's value of a menu: the expected maximal state-contingent utility."
    return sum(π_s * max(U_s[z] for z in menu) for π_s, U_s in zip(π, U))

π = (0.9, 0.1)
U = ({'steak': 1, 'chicken': 0}, {'steak': 0, 'chicken': 1})
for menu in (['steak'], ['chicken'], ['steak', 'chicken']):
    print(f"{str(menu):24s} {menu_value(menu, π, U):.1f}")
['steak']                0.9
['chicken']              0.1
['steak', 'chicken']     1.0

The menu that contains both meals is worth \(1\), more than either single meal.

Exercise 75.1 asks you to carry out Kreps’s construction of \(S\) and \(U\) from a ranking of menus.

75.2.2. Unforeseen contingencies#

Kreps [1992] gives the subjective states of (75.3) a different interpretation.

In his example, a traveler packs for a vacation at a destination that the traveler learns only later.

A firm offers to ship baggage contingent on the destination, and also to ship a contingent set of baggage, from which the traveler picks after arriving.

A traveler who could list every relevant contingency would not pay for the second service, because it could decide in advance which baggage to take in each contingency.

Kreps writes:

I contend that a desire to preserve flexibility is indicative of anticipated unforeseen contingencies; but it is not necessarily logically sufficient for this phenomenon.

He formalizes the idea by refining each contingency that the traveler can list into subjective substates, and he values a contingent opportunity set by an increasing function of the maximal utilities that it provides in the substates.

That is the ordinal form of his 1979 representation, applied contingency by contingency; Kreps obtains the additive form (75.3) only under special assumptions, two of which he says “seem unwarranted.”

Kreps acknowledges that a traveler who foresees a contingency that no contract can describe also values flexibility:

At the level of static choice, the two are observationally equivalent.

Dekel et al. [2001] extended Kreps’s analysis to menus of lotteries and gave conditions under which the subjective state space is unique.

75.2.3. Preference for commitment#

Kreps contrasts preference for flexibility with the “changing tastes” studied by Strotz [1956] and others:

In these papers, changes in tastes are anticipated, and the individual attempts to constrain later choices so that eventual choice is as good as possible from the point of view of current tastes. In such situations flexibility is not desirable. Rather, a desire for inflexibility or precommitment characterizes the choice of opportunity sets.

Kreps [1992] offers an example:

Odysseus, for example, preferred a reduced set of options for the contingency that his vacation included a cruise past the Isle of the Sirens.

Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] replace (75.2) with set betweenness,

(75.5)#\[x \succsim y \implies x \succsim x \cup y \succsim y .\]

Set betweenness allows two kinds of behavior that (75.2) rules out.

  • A decision maker has a preference for commitment at a menu \(x\) if some subset \(y \subset x\) satisfies \(y \succ x\).

  • A decision maker has self-control at \(x\) if there are menus \(y\) and \(y'\) with \(y \cup y' = x\) and \(y \succ x \succ y'\).

In the first case, the decision maker would like to remove options from \(x\); in the second, it resists the temptation that \(y'\) presents, at a cost that makes \(x\) worse than \(y\).

Set betweenness also rules out the strict preference for flexibility that Kreps studies, because it never ranks \(x \cup y\) strictly above both \(x\) and \(y\).

A preference that satisfies both (75.2) and (75.5) satisfies (75.1).

Gul and Pesendorfer take the elements of a menu to be lotteries.

With completeness, transitivity, continuity, set betweenness, and an independence axiom on menus that Dekel et al. [2001] introduced, they show that a menu \(x\) has the value

(75.6)#\[W(x) = \max_{\mu \in x} \left\{ U(\mu) + V(\mu) \right\} - \max_{\nu \in x} V(\nu) ,\]

where \(U\) and \(V\) are linear functions on lotteries.

The function \(U\) is the commitment utility, the value that the decision maker assigns to \(\mu\) when \(\mu\) is the only option, since \(W(\{\mu\}) = U(\mu)\).

The function \(V\) is the temptation utility; \(V(\nu)\) measures how strongly option \(\nu\) tempts the decision maker.

Gul and Pesendorfer interpret the representation as describing a decision maker who chooses the option that maximizes \(U + V\).

The term \(\max_{\nu \in x} V(\nu)\) is the temptation utility of the most tempting option on the menu; it does not depend on the choice.

A decision maker who chooses \(\mu\) while \(\nu\) is the most tempting option bears the cost of self-control \(V(\nu) - V(\mu)\).

If \(\mu^\ast\) is the choice and \(\nu^\ast\) the most tempting option, then \(W(x) = U(\mu^\ast) - [V(\nu^\ast) - V(\mu^\ast)]\), the commitment utility of the choice less the cost of self-control.

The next cell evaluates menus of a healthy option \(h\) and a tempting option \(t\) for two temptation utilities.

def gp_value(menu, U, V):
    "Gul and Pesendorfer's value of a menu: max(U + V) - max V."
    return max(U[x] + V[x] for x in menu) - max(V[x] for x in menu)

U = {'h': 10, 't': 4}
for V in ({'h': 2, 't': 7}, {'h': 2, 't': 9}):
    choice = max(['h', 't'], key=lambda x: U[x] + V[x])
    print(f"V = {V}: W({{h}}) = {gp_value({'h'}, U, V)}, "
          f"W({{h, t}}) = {gp_value({'h', 't'}, U, V)}, "
          f"W({{t}}) = {gp_value({'t'}, U, V)}, choice from {{h, t}}: {choice}")
V = {'h': 2, 't': 7}: W({h}) = 10, W({h, t}) = 5, W({t}) = 4, choice from {h, t}: h
V = {'h': 2, 't': 9}: W({h}) = 10, W({h, t}) = 4, W({t}) = 4, choice from {h, t}: t

With the first temptation utility, the decision maker chooses \(h\) from \(\{h, t\}\) and bears the self-control cost \(V(t) - V(h) = 5\), so \(\{h\} \succ \{h, t\} \succ \{t\}\).

With the second, the cost \(7\) exceeds the difference \(6\) between \(U(h)\) and \(U(t)\), so the decision maker succumbs and chooses \(t\), and \(\{h, t\} \sim \{t\}\).

The first case exhibits both self-control and a preference for commitment at \(\{h, t\}\); the second exhibits a preference for commitment without self-control.

75.3. Dynamic self-control preferences#

75.3.1. Infinite-horizon consumption problems#

Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] extend (75.6) to an infinite horizon.

Let \(C\) be a compact set of possible consumptions in each period.

An infinite-horizon consumption problem \(z\) is a compact set of lotteries, each of which yields consumption \(c \in C\) in the current period and an infinite-horizon consumption problem \(z'\) that starts next period.

Gul and Pesendorfer show that the set \(\mathcal{Z}\) of such problems is well defined, and they identify it with the set of compact sets of probability measures on \(C \times \mathcal{Z}\).

Section 4 of Kreps [1979] had extended his theorem to pairs of current consumption and a menu for next period.

Kreps ended his 1992 essay by asking how to extend his representation to more than two periods:

The setting is that one chooses immediate consumption and opportunity sets the elements of which are next-period consumption and further opportunity sets.

He added that he could not provide an axiomatic justification for the representation that this setting suggests.

Gul and Pesendorfer construct that domain, extending the domain of Kreps and Porteus [1978], in which a decision maker chooses lotteries over current consumption and next period’s decision problem, to an infinite horizon; they axiomatize a representation on it for temptation rather than flexibility.

Gul and Pesendorfer impose eight axioms on a preference \(\succsim\) over \(\mathcal{Z}\).

  • Preference relation: \(\succsim\) is complete and transitive.

  • Continuity: the upper and lower contour sets of \(\succsim\) are closed.

  • Set betweenness: (75.5) holds.

  • Independence: the ranking of singleton problems satisfies the independence axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern.

  • Separability: the correlation between current consumption and the continuation problem does not affect the ranking.

  • Stationarity: \(\{(c, x)\} \succsim \{(c, y)\}\) if and only if \(x \succsim y\).

  • Indifference to timing: the consumer does not care whether uncertainty about the continuation problem resolves today or tomorrow.

  • Temptation by immediate consumption: two options that yield the same lottery over current consumption present the same temptation.

The axiom of indifference to timing rules out the preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty that Kreps and Porteus [1978] allow.

Gul and Pesendorfer call a preference nondegenerate if some decision problem is strictly better than one of its subsets, and they call nondegenerate preferences that satisfy the eight axioms dynamic self-control preferences.

Their Theorem 1 gives the representation.

Theorem (Dynamic self-control preferences)

If a nondegenerate preference \(\succsim\) satisfies the eight axioms, then there exist \(\delta \in (0, 1)\), continuous functions \(u, v : C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\), and a continuous function \(W\) that represents \(\succsim\) such that

\[ W(z) = \max_{\mu \in z} \int \left[ u(c) + v(c) + \delta W(z') \right] d\mu(c, z') - \max_{\nu \in z} \int v(c) \, d\nu(c, z') \]

for all \(z \in \mathcal{Z}\).

Conversely, for any \(\delta \in (0, 1)\) and continuous \(u\) and \(v\), a unique continuous function \(W\) satisfies this equation, and the preference that it represents satisfies the eight axioms.

Their Theorem 2 states that \((u, v, \delta)\) and \((u', v', \delta')\) represent the same preference if and only if \(\delta' = \delta\), \(u' = a u + k_u\), and \(v' = a v + k_v\) for some \(a > 0\) and constants \(k_u\) and \(k_v\).

The representation is a single Bellman equation in \(W\).

The function \(v\) that appears in it is a primitive of the preference, not a value function.

The single Bellman equation relies on the axiom of temptation by immediate consumption: because the most tempting option depends only on current consumption, the subtracted maximum does not involve \(W\).

Gul and Pesendorfer state that without that axiom, and without nondegeneracy, they would obtain an analogous representation in which the temptation utility is an unrestricted linear function of lotteries over current consumption and continuation problems, so that the subtracted maximum could depend on \(W\).

75.3.2. Choice and welfare#

In each period the consumer chooses \(\mu \in z\) to maximize \(E_\mu[u + v + \delta W]\).

This choice behavior is an assumption: the representation ranks decision problems, and Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] give conditions under which choices from decision problems agree with it.

The consumer’s welfare from that choice is \(E_\mu[u + v + \delta W] - \max_{\nu \in z} E_\nu[v]\).

Gul and Pesendorfer call \(u + \delta W\) the commitment utility and \(v\) the temptation utility of the infinite-horizon problem.

The preference is dynamically consistent: at date \(t\) the consumer ranks continuation problems \(z'\) by \(W\), the same function by which it ranks decision problems at date \(t + 1\).

Gul and Pesendorfer contrast their interpretation with an alternative that attributes the same behavior to a distinct decision maker in each period, whose welfare depends only on the option chosen.

The two interpretations predict the same choices and imply different welfare comparisons.

Gul and Pesendorfer reject the alternative:

The changing tastes interpretation assumes a choice-problem independence of welfare that seems to contradict the very premise of a model of self-control.

Gul and Pesendorfer say that a preference \(\succsim_1\) has more preference for commitment than \(\succsim_2\) if, in every decision problem whose options all lead to the same distribution of continuation problems, \(\succsim_1\) has a preference for commitment whenever \(\succsim_2\) does; they define more self-control in the same way.

Their Corollary 1 characterizes these comparisons for preferences in which \(v\) is not an affine transformation of \(u\).

  • Replacing \(v\) by \(\gamma v\), with \(\gamma > 1\) and \(u\) fixed, lowers self-control and leaves the preference for commitment unchanged.

  • Replacing \((u, v)\) by \((u + (1 - \gamma) v, \gamma v)\), with \(\gamma > 1\) and \(u + v\) fixed, raises the preference for commitment and leaves self-control unchanged.

In the savings problem and the steady-state wealth distribution below, a parameter \(\lambda\) scales \(v\) with \(u\) fixed, so a larger \(\lambda\) means less self-control; in the asset-pricing example, \(\lambda\) scales \(v\) with \(u + v\) fixed, so a larger \(\lambda\) means more preference for commitment.

75.3.3. Preference reversal#

In experiments reported by Kirby and Herrnstein [1995], subjects choose a smaller reward at date \(t\) over a larger reward at date \(t + 1\) when they decide at date \(t\), but choose the larger, later reward when they decide earlier.

Gul and Pesendorfer show that a consumer with dynamic self-control preferences can make these choices.

Let the consumer consume \(\bar c\) in every period except for a reward: a smaller reward \(m\) at date \(t\) or a larger reward \(M > m\) at date \(t + 1\).

Write \(D_\rho = u(\bar c + \rho) - u(\bar c)\) for the utility gain from a reward \(\rho\), and \(S_m = v(\bar c + m) - v(\bar c)\) for the self-control cost of refusing the reward \(m\) when it is available immediately.

A consumer who decides at date \(t\) compares \(u(\bar c + m) + \delta u(\bar c)\) with \(u(\bar c) - S_m + \delta u(\bar c + M)\), omitting terms common to both, and takes the smaller reward if \(S_m > \delta D_M - D_m\).

A consumer who decides at date \(t - 1\) bears no self-control cost, because neither choice affects consumption at date \(t - 1\), and takes the smaller reward if \(0 > \delta D_M - D_m\).

The consumer reverses its choice when

\[ S_m > \delta D_M - D_m > 0 . \]

The consumer bears the self-control cost \(S_m\) only when it decides in the period in which it can consume the smaller reward.

Exercise 75.2 compares the rewards that produce reversals for this consumer with those that produce reversals for a \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer.

75.4. A consumption-savings problem#

75.4.1. One Bellman equation#

A consumer begins a period with wealth \(b\), consumes \(c \in [0, b]\), and carries wealth \(b' = R(b - c)\) into the next period, where \(R > 1\) is a gross return.

The consumer cannot borrow and \(v\) is increasing, so the most tempting choice is to consume all wealth, and the maximal temptation utility is \(v(b)\).

The representation in Gul and Pesendorfer's Theorem 1 becomes

(75.7)#\[W(b) = \max_{0 \le c \le b} \left\{ u(c) + v(c) + \delta W(R(b - c)) \right\} - v(b) .\]

Because \(v(b)\) does not depend on \(c\), (75.7) is itself an ordinary Bellman equation, with one-period return \(u(c) + v(c) - v(b)\).

Define \(V(b) = W(b) + v(b)\), the value of the objective \(u + v + \delta W\) that the consumer maximizes.

Substituting \(W = V - v\) into (75.7) gives

(75.8)#\[V(b) = \max_{0 \le c \le b} \left\{ u(c) + v(c) - \delta v(R(b - c)) + \delta V(R(b - c)) \right\} .\]

The one-period return in (75.8), \(u(c) + v(c) - \delta v(b')\), depends on the current choice and on next period’s wealth; \(\delta v(b')\) is the discounted temptation utility of consuming all of next period’s wealth, and it enters with a minus sign.

When returns are bounded, the Bellman operator on the right side of (75.8) is a contraction with modulus \(\delta\).

The returns \(\log c\) and \(\lambda c\) in the example below are unbounded, so we iterate on (75.8) on a grid of wealth and check the resulting decision rule against the Euler equation (75.9).

At an interior optimum, the first-order condition \(u'(c) + v'(c) = \delta R \, [V'(b') - v'(b')]\) and the envelope condition \(V'(b) = u'(c) + v'(c)\) give the Euler equation of Gul and Pesendorfer,

(75.9)#\[u'(c_t) + v'(c_t) = \delta R \left[ u'(c_{t+1}) + v'(c_{t+1}) - v'(b_{t+1}) \right] .\]

The last term distinguishes (75.9) from the Euler equation of a standard consumer.

Saving a unit at date \(t\) raises wealth at date \(t + 1\), which raises the temptation utility of consuming all wealth at date \(t + 1\) and therefore the cost of self-control.

We use

\[ u(c) = \log c , \qquad v(c) = \lambda c , \qquad \lambda \ge 0 . \]

Because \(v\) is linear, \(v'(c_{t+1}) = v'(b_{t+1}) = \lambda\), the last two terms of (75.9) cancel, and (75.9) becomes

\[ \frac{1}{c_t} + \lambda = \frac{\delta R}{c_{t+1}}, \qquad \text{or} \qquad c_{t+1} = \frac{\delta R \, c_t}{1 + \lambda c_t} . \]

When \(\lambda = 0\) and \(\delta R > 1\), consumption grows at the gross rate \(\delta R\) forever, and so does wealth.

When \(\lambda > 0\) and \(\delta R > 1\), the difference equation for consumption has the stable steady state

(75.10)#\[c^\ast = \frac{\delta R - 1}{\lambda}, \qquad b^\ast = \frac{R \, c^\ast}{R - 1} ,\]

where \(b^\ast\) is the constant wealth that finances consumption \(c^\ast\) in every period.

The slope of \(c_{t+1}\) with respect to \(c_t\) at \(c^\ast\) is \(1/(\delta R) < 1\).

The steady state does not depend on initial wealth.

Each unit of wealth carries a marginal self-control cost \(\lambda\), and that cost stops a consumer with \(\delta R > 1\) from accumulating wealth without bound.

The next cell sets up a consumer with \(\delta = 0.95\), \(R = 1.1\), and \(\lambda = 0.1\).

We put the value function on a grid of log wealth, interpolate it with a cubic spline, and choose the saving rate \(s = 1 - c/b\) at each grid point by golden-section search.

Consumer = namedtuple('Consumer', ('δ', 'R', 'λ', 'x_grid'))

def create_consumer(δ=0.95, R=1.10, λ=0.1, b_min=1e-3, b_max=30.0, n=200):
    "A consumer with u(c) = log c and v(c) = λ c, and a grid on log wealth."
    x_grid = np.linspace(np.log(b_min), np.log(b_max), n)
    return Consumer(δ=δ, R=R, λ=λ, x_grid=x_grid)

def golden_max(f, n, tol=1e-10):
    "Maximize f over (0, 1) for n problems at once by golden-section search."
    g = (np.sqrt(5) - 1) / 2
    lo, hi = np.zeros(n), np.ones(n)
    while np.max(hi - lo) > tol:
        s_1, s_2 = hi - g * (hi - lo), lo + g * (hi - lo)
        left = f(s_1) > f(s_2)
        lo, hi = np.where(left, lo, s_1), np.where(left, s_2, hi)
    return (lo + hi) / 2

def T(V, con):
    "Bellman operator in (tsc-V); returns T V and the maximizing saving rates."
    δ, R, λ, x_grid = con
    b = np.exp(x_grid)
    V_f = CubicSpline(x_grid, V)

    def objective(s):
        c, b_next = (1 - s) * b, R * s * b
        return np.log(c) + λ * c - δ * λ * b_next + δ * V_f(np.log(b_next))

    s = golden_max(objective, len(b))
    return objective(s), s

def solve_consumer(con, tol=1e-9, max_iter=10_000):
    "Iterate on T until convergence; return V and consumption on the grid."
    V = np.zeros(len(con.x_grid))
    for _ in range(max_iter):
        V_new, s = T(V, con)
        if np.max(np.abs(V_new - V)) < tol:
            return V_new, (1 - s) * np.exp(con.x_grid)
        V = V_new
    raise RuntimeError("value function iteration did not converge")

def simulate(c_grid, con, b_0, periods=60):
    "Paths of wealth and consumption from initial wealth b_0."
    c_f = CubicSpline(con.x_grid, c_grid)
    b, c = np.empty(periods + 1), np.empty(periods)
    b[0] = b_0
    for t in range(periods):
        c[t] = c_f(np.log(b[t]))
        b[t + 1] = con.R * (b[t] - c[t])
    return b, c

con = create_consumer()
_, c_gp = solve_consumer(con)

δ, R, λ = con.δ, con.R, con.λ
c_star = (δ * R - 1) / λ
b_star = R * c_star / (R - 1)
b_path, c_path = simulate(c_gp, con, b_0=2.0)
euler_error = (1 / c_path[:-1] + λ) / (δ * R / c_path[1:]) - 1
print(f"c* = {c_star:.4f}, b* = {b_star:.4f}")
print(f"from b_0 = 2: c_60 = {c_path[-1]:.4f}, b_60 = {b_path[-1]:.4f}")
print(f"largest Euler equation error along the path: "
      f"{np.max(np.abs(euler_error)):.1e}")
c* = 0.4500, b* = 4.9500
from b_0 = 2: c_60 = 0.3841, b_60 = 4.4455
largest Euler equation error along the path: 1.5e-07

Value function iteration delivers a decision rule that satisfies the Euler equation (75.9) to about seven digits, and the path of wealth from \(b_0 = 2\) approaches \(b^\ast\).

At the steady state the consumer bears the self-control cost \(v(b^\ast) - v(c^\ast) = \lambda (b^\ast - c^\ast) = 0.45\) in every period.

75.4.2. Two Bellman equations#

The \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer of Laibson [1997] ranks consumption sequences at date \(t\) by

\[ u(c_t) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^\infty \delta^j u(c_{t+j}) , \qquad 0 < \beta \le 1 . \]

The lecture Institution Building Without Commitment uses the same preferences with the roles of the letters \(\beta\) and \(\delta\) exchanged, following Bassetto et al. [2024].

The self at date \(t\) chooses \(c_t\) and takes as given the decision rule \(\sigma\) by which later selves choose consumption.

In a Markov equilibrium every self uses the same decision rule \(\sigma\), a function of current wealth, and a pair of functions \((V, W)\) and \(\sigma\) satisfy

(75.11)#\[V(b) = \max_{0 \le c \le b} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \delta W(R(b - c)) \right\} ,\]
(75.12)#\[W(b) = u(\sigma(b)) + \delta W(R(b - \sigma(b))) ,\]

where \(\sigma(b)\) attains the maximum in (75.11).

The continuation value \(W\) satisfies its own Bellman equation (75.12) and appears in the objective that the current self maximizes in (75.11), where \(V\) appears only on the left side.

Equation (75.12) evaluates \(W\) under the decision rule that (75.11) selects.

The pair (75.11)–(75.12) is an instance of what Time Inconsistency of Ramsey Plans calls dynamic programming squared.

In both models, the value \(V\) of the objective that the current decision maker maximizes differs from the continuation value \(W\).

In the Gul–Pesendorfer model, \(V(b) - W(b) = v(b)\) is a known function of wealth, so substituting \(W = V - v\) leaves the single Bellman equation (75.8).

In the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) model, \(V(b) - W(b) = -(1 - \beta) \delta W(R(b - \sigma(b)))\) depends on the decision rule, so no such substitution removes (75.12).

Because \(\sigma\) maximizes \(u + \beta \delta W\) rather than the right side of (75.12), the operator that maps \(W\) into the right side of (75.12) need not be monotone, and Blackwell’s argument that a Bellman operator is a contraction does not apply.

Krusell and Smith [2003] show that the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumption-savings problem in a neoclassical growth model has a continuum of Markov equilibria, whose savings rules are discontinuous.

With \(u(c) = \log c\), a Markov equilibrium exists in which \(W(b) = A + B \log b\).

Given such a \(W\), the current self’s problem (75.11) has the solution \(\sigma(b) = \kappa b\) with \(\kappa = 1/(1 + \beta \delta B)\).

Substituting \(\sigma\) into (75.12) gives

\[ B' = 1 + \delta B , \qquad A' = \log \kappa + \delta \left[ A + B \log(R(1 - \kappa)) \right] . \]

The next cell iterates on these two equations, alternating between (75.11) and (75.12).

def solve_βδ(β, δ, R, tol=1e-12, max_iter=10_000):
    "Markov equilibrium of the log β-δ consumer; W(b) = A + B log b."
    A, B = 0.0, 1.0
    for _ in range(max_iter):
        κ = 1 / (1 + β * δ * B)                       # current self, (tsc-bd-V)
        A_new = np.log(κ) + δ * (A + B * np.log(R * (1 - κ)))
        B_new = 1 + δ * B                             # continuation, (tsc-bd-W)
        if max(abs(A_new - A), abs(B_new - B)) < tol:
            return 1 / (1 + β * δ * B_new), A_new, B_new
        A, B = A_new, B_new
    raise RuntimeError("the iteration did not converge")

for β in (1.0, 0.7, 0.5):
    κ, A, B = solve_βδ(β, δ, R)
    κ_formula = (1 - δ) / (1 - δ + β * δ)
    print(f"β = {β}: B = {B:.4f}, κ = {κ:.5f} (formula {κ_formula:.5f}), "
          f"gross growth of wealth R(1 - κ) = {R * (1 - κ):.4f}")
β = 1.0: B = 20.0000, κ = 0.05000 (formula 0.05000), gross growth of wealth R(1 - κ) = 1.0450
β = 0.7: B = 20.0000, κ = 0.06993 (formula 0.06993), gross growth of wealth R(1 - κ) = 1.0231
β = 0.5: B = 20.0000, κ = 0.09524 (formula 0.09524), gross growth of wealth R(1 - κ) = 0.9952

The iteration converges to \(B = 1/(1 - \delta)\) and to the marginal propensity to consume

\[ \kappa = \frac{1 - \delta}{1 - \delta + \beta \delta} . \]

With log utility the recursion for \(B\) does not involve \(\kappa\), so \(B\) converges to \(1/(1 - \delta)\) for every \(\beta\); \(\beta\) affects only the current self’s choice of \(\kappa\).

The iteration starts from \(A = 0\) and \(B = 1\), the value \(W(b) = \log b\) of consuming all wealth in a final period, so its \(T\)-th step computes the unique Markov equilibrium of a problem with \(T + 1\) periods, and the equilibrium above is the limit of these finite-horizon equilibria.

The \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer consumes a constant fraction \(\kappa\) of wealth, whatever the return \(R\), and wealth grows or shrinks at the constant gross rate \(R(1 - \kappa)\).

With \(\beta < 1\) the consumer consumes a larger fraction of wealth than a consumer with \(\beta = 1\), but the decision rule is still linear, and unless \(R(1 - \kappa) = 1\), wealth has no steady state other than zero.

With \(\beta = 0.5\), \(R(1 - \kappa) \approx 0.995\), and wealth shrinks toward zero.

Fig. 75.1 compares the Gul–Pesendorfer consumer with \(\lambda = 0.1\), the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer with \(\beta = 0.7\), and a standard consumer with \(\lambda = 0\) and \(\beta = 1\).

b_grid = np.exp(con.x_grid)
κ_07, _, _ = solve_βδ(0.7, δ, R)
mask = b_grid <= 12

fig, axes = plt.subplots(1, 2, figsize=(11, 4.5))
ax = axes[0]
ax.plot(b_grid[mask], c_gp[mask], lw=2,
        label=rf'Gul–Pesendorfer, $\lambda = {λ}$')
ax.plot(b_grid[mask], κ_07 * b_grid[mask], lw=2, ls='--',
        label=r'$\beta$-$\delta$, $\beta = 0.7$')
ax.plot(b_grid[mask], (1 - δ) * b_grid[mask], lw=2, ls=':',
        label=r'standard, $\lambda = 0$ or $\beta = 1$')
ax.plot(b_grid[mask], (R - 1) / R * b_grid[mask], 'k', lw=1,
        label=r'$c = (R - 1) b / R$')
ax.plot(b_star, c_star, 'ko', label=r'$(b^\ast, c^\ast)$')
ax.set_xlabel('wealth $b$')
ax.set_ylabel('consumption $c$')
ax.legend()

ax = axes[1]
for b_0 in (0.5, 2.0, 10.0):
    b_path, _ = simulate(c_gp, con, b_0, periods=100)
    ax.plot(b_path, 'C0', lw=2)
    ax.plot(b_0 * (R * (1 - κ_07)) ** np.arange(len(b_path)), 'C1--', lw=2)
ax.axhline(b_star, color='k', lw=1, label=r'$b^\ast$')
ax.set_yscale('log')
ax.set_xlabel('period $t$')
ax.set_ylabel('wealth $b_t$')
ax.plot([], [], 'C0', lw=2, label='Gul–Pesendorfer')
ax.plot([], [], 'C1--', lw=2, label=r'$\beta$-$\delta$, $\beta = 0.7$')
ax.legend()
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
_images/be5d2e6099673e88ea298d205444931b66fca082e3f18a48cfacf50119efb4b1.png

Fig. 75.1 Consumption rules and wealth paths#

In the left panel, the black line is the consumption \((R - 1) b / R\) that keeps wealth constant.

The Gul–Pesendorfer rule crosses it at the dot \((b^\ast, c^\ast)\): below \(b^\ast\) the consumer saves, and above \(b^\ast\) the consumer runs wealth down.

The \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) rule and the standard rule lie below the black line at every level of wealth, so those consumers accumulate wealth without bound.

In the right panel, wealth paths of the Gul–Pesendorfer consumer from three initial levels converge to \(b^\ast \approx 4.95\), while wealth paths of the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer grow at the constant gross rate \(R(1 - \kappa) \approx 1.023\).

75.4.3. Self-control as a property of preferences#

Gul and Pesendorfer contrast the two approaches in their conclusion.

In the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) approach, a decision problem may not have a unique payoff, because the game among selves can have many subgame-perfect equilibria.

They argue that multiplicity is hard to interpret in a problem with a single decision maker:

In that case, the game-theoretic argument for multiplicity loses much of its force since it should be straightforward to renegotiate one’s self out of an unattractive continuation equilibrium.

They attribute the argument about renegotiation to Kocherlakota [1996].

Gul and Pesendorfer argue that the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) approach can model self-control only by selecting an equilibrium in which the threat of worse behavior after a deviation sustains good behavior, so that self-control is a property of the selected equilibrium.

In the Gul–Pesendorfer approach, each \((u, v, \delta)\) represents a unique preference, all optimal plans yield the same payoff, and self-control is a property of the preference, measured by parameters such as \(\lambda\).

75.5. Equilibrium implications#

75.5.1. Steady-state wealth distributions#

Gul and Pesendorfer study an exchange economy with one good, a constant aggregate endowment \(\omega\), and consumers \(i = 1, \ldots, n\) who share \(u\), \(v\), and \(\delta\) but differ in self-control: consumer \(i\) has temptation utility \(\lambda_i v\).

Their Proposition 2 states that each aggregate endowment has a unique steady-state equilibrium, in which a consumer with more self-control consumes more.

With \(u(c) = \log c\) and \(v(c) = c\), the Euler equation (75.9) in a steady state with gross interest rate \(R\) becomes \(1 + \lambda_i c_i = \delta R\).

Writing \(\gamma_i = 1 / \lambda_i\) and imposing \(\sum_i c_i = \omega\) gives

(75.13)#\[c_i = \frac{\omega \gamma_i}{\sum_j \gamma_j} , \qquad R = \frac{\omega + \sum_j \gamma_j}{\delta \sum_j \gamma_j} .\]

The steady-state distribution of consumption and wealth depends on the \(\lambda_i\) and on \(\omega\), and not on the initial distribution of wealth.

A mean-preserving spread of the \(\gamma_i\) raises inequality and leaves \(R\) unchanged, while a larger \(\omega\) raises \(R\) and leaves consumption shares unchanged.

When every \(\lambda_i = 0\), the steady state requires \(\delta R = 1\), and any division of the aggregate endowment among consumers is a steady state.

The next cell computes (75.13) for three consumers with \(\lambda_i = 0.05\), \(0.1\), and \(0.2\), \(\omega = 3\), and \(\delta = 0.95\), and checks it against the consumer’s problem.

It solves each consumer’s problem (75.8) at the steady-state interest rate and simulates from equal initial wealth.

def steady_state(λ_list, ω, δ):
    "Steady-state consumption of each consumer and the gross interest rate."
    γ = 1 / np.asarray(λ_list)
    return ω * γ / γ.sum(), (ω + γ.sum()) / (δ * γ.sum())

λ_list, ω = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2), 3.0
c_ss, R_ss = steady_state(λ_list, ω, δ=0.95)
b_ss = R_ss * c_ss / (R_ss - 1)
print(f"steady-state gross interest rate R = {R_ss:.4f}")

b_0 = b_ss.mean()
for λ_i, c_i, b_i in zip(λ_list, c_ss, b_ss):
    con_i = create_consumer(δ=0.95, R=R_ss, λ=λ_i)
    _, c_i_grid = solve_consumer(con_i)
    b_path, c_path = simulate(c_i_grid, con_i, b_0, periods=300)
    print(f"λ = {λ_i}: steady state c = {c_i:.4f}, b = {b_i:.4f}; "
          f"from b_0 = {b_0:.2f}, c_300 = {c_path[-1]:.4f}, "
          f"b_300 = {b_path[-1]:.4f}")
steady-state gross interest rate R = 1.1429
λ = 0.05: steady state c = 1.7143, b = 13.7143; from b_0 = 8.00, c_300 = 1.7143, b_300 = 13.7143
λ = 0.1: steady state c = 0.8571, b = 6.8571; from b_0 = 8.00, c_300 = 0.8571, b_300 = 6.8571
λ = 0.2: steady state c = 0.4286, b = 3.4286; from b_0 = 8.00, c_300 = 0.4286, b_300 = 3.4286

At the steady-state interest rate, each consumer’s wealth converges from the common initial level to \(b_i = R c_i / (R - 1)\).

This is a partial-equilibrium check: along the transition, aggregate consumption differs from \(\omega\), so the constant interest rate \(R\) does not clear markets, and Gul and Pesendorfer do not study convergence to the steady state.

Steady-state wealth is inversely proportional to \(\lambda_i\): the consumer with \(\lambda_i = 0.05\) holds four times the wealth of the consumer with \(\lambda_i = 0.2\).

When \(v\) is strictly convex, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at \(t\) and \(t + 1\) depends on wealth at \(t + 1\), through the term \(v'(b_{t+1})\) in (75.9).

With the linear \(v\) of the example, that term is the constant \(\lambda\), and the Euler equation can be written \(1/c_t = [\delta/(1 + \lambda c_t)] \, R / c_{t+1}\): the consumer acts as if its discount factor \(\delta/(1 + \lambda c_t)\) falls as its consumption rises.

Gul and Pesendorfer compare this feature with the endogenous rates of time preference of Uzawa [1968] and Epstein and Hynes [1983], in which the marginal rate of substitution depends on later consumption and therefore on wealth.

75.5.2. Inefficiency and nonbinding constraints#

A consumer’s welfare depends on the set of consumption bundles that it can afford at given prices and wealth, not only on the bundle that it chooses.

Gul and Pesendorfer therefore define Pareto efficiency for a planner who can reallocate resources and change prices but cannot remove options from consumers’ budget sets.

They give an example of a two-good economy with a representative consumer in which, they argue, the planner raises welfare by destroying some of the endowment of the tempting good.

Destroying the good raises its price, which lowers the amount of it that the consumer can afford and so lowers the cost of self-control.

Gul and Pesendorfer argue that in their example this effect outweighs the loss of consumption, and that a tax on the tempting good has the same effect if the government uses the proceeds to buy and destroy the good.

Their calculation uses equilibrium prices that omit the self-control term of the Euler equation (75.9).

With prices that satisfy (75.9), destroying the tempting good lowers welfare in their example for every \(\lambda \in (0, 1/2)\), so the example does not establish their claim.[1]

They also show that adding a borrowing constraint that does not bind in equilibrium changes equilibrium prices.

In their example, the constraint limits each consumer’s borrowing to its endowment in the next period.

The constraint lowers the maximal consumption available to the consumer in each period, and with it the cost of self-control.

To keep the Euler equation (75.9) satisfied, the equilibrium interest rate falls.

Consumption then tracks income: consumers do not shift funds to low-income periods, because doing so would raise the maximal consumption available in those periods and with it the cost of self-control.

75.5.3. The equity premium#

Gul and Pesendorfer compute asset prices in a version of the exchange economy of Lucas [1978] with a representative consumer whose commitment utility and temptation utility are

\[ u(c) = c - \frac{\lambda c^2}{2} , \qquad v(c) = \frac{\lambda c^2}{2} , \qquad 0 < \lambda < \frac12 . \]

Because \(u + v\) is linear, the consumer is risk neutral toward gambles over current consumption.

Because \(v\) is convex, the cost of self-control is convex in wealth, so the consumer is averse to risk in future wealth.

A risky asset makes future wealth uncertain, so it must pay an expected return above the risk-free rate.

By Corollary 1, a larger \(\lambda\) raises the preference for commitment and leaves self-control unchanged, and Gul and Pesendorfer show that it raises the equity premium.

Exercise 75.3 asks you to compute the premium.

75.5.4. Sustainable debt#

Bulow and Rogoff [1989] show that if the only punishment for default is exclusion from future borrowing, and a defaulter can still save at the market interest rate, then a consumer with standard preferences cannot borrow at all.

A consumer who defaults and saves the amounts that it would have repaid can finance strictly more consumption than the contract provides, so it prefers to default.

Gul and Pesendorfer show that a consumer with dynamic self-control preferences can borrow under such a contract.

A debt contract extends credit that becomes available only at a later date, so the consumer does not bear the self-control cost of having the funds available in the meantime.

Savings, in contrast, remain available to consume, so they raise the cost of self-control.

Gul and Pesendorfer add that creditworthiness, unlike savings, cannot serve as collateral, so the consumer cannot undo the commitment of a debt contract in the market.

Their Proposition 3 gives a contract with a three-period cycle of borrowing and repayment that a consumer with a kinked commitment utility and linear temptation utility prefers to honor when \(\delta\) is close enough to one, the interest rate is at most \((1 - \delta)/\delta\), and its temptation parameter \(\lambda\) lies in an interval.

75.6. Connections to other lectures#

75.7. Exercises#

Exercise 75.1

Kreps’s proof of his Theorem 1 constructs a state space and a utility function from a ranking of menus.

For a menu \(x\), define \(f(x)\) as the union of all menus \(x'\) with \(x \sim x \cup x'\); \(f(x)\) is the largest menu that contains \(x\) and is indifferent to \(x\).

The states are the menus \(s\) with \(f(s) = s\), and \(U(z, s) = 0\) if \(z \notin s\) and \(U(z, s) = a(s) < 0\) if \(z \in s\), so that

\[ \Phi(x) = \sum_{s \supseteq x, \, f(s) = s} a(s) . \]

Kreps’s Lemma 3 chooses the negative numbers \(a(s)\) by induction, starting with the best states and moving down, so that each state’s sum \(\sum_{s' \supseteq s} a(s')\) is equal within a class of indifferent states and lower than the sums of all better states.

Let \(Z = \{\text{steak}, \text{chicken}, \text{fish}\}\), and generate a ranking of the seven menus from (75.3) with two moods: a hungry mood, with probability \(0.6\) and utilities \(3, 1, 0\) for steak, chicken, and fish, and a light mood, with probability \(0.4\) and utilities \(0, 2, 3\).

  1. Check that the ranking satisfies (75.2) and (75.4).

  2. Compute \(f\), the states, and the numbers \(a(s)\).

  3. Check that Kreps’s representation ranks the seven menus as the two-mood representation does, and compare the number of states in the two representations.

Exercise 75.2

Consider the preference reversal experiment of the lecture, with baseline consumption \(\bar c = 1\), \(u(c) = \log c\), and \(\delta = 0.95\).

A Gul–Pesendorfer consumer has \(v(c) = \lambda c\) with \(\lambda = 0.2\).

A \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer has \(\beta = 0.8\).

  1. Show that the \(\beta\)-\(\delta\) consumer reverses its choice between the smaller reward \(m\) at date \(t\) and the larger reward \(M\) at date \(t + 1\) when \(\beta \delta D_M < D_m < \delta D_M\).

  2. For \(m \in (0, 2]\), compute and plot the smallest and largest \(M\) that produce a reversal for each consumer, and the width of the range of \(D_M\) that produces a reversal.

  3. How does the range of \(M\) that produces a reversal depend on \(m\) in the two models?

Exercise 75.3

In the Lucas tree economy of Gul and Pesendorfer, a representative consumer owns one share of a tree whose dividend \(d\) is independently and identically distributed over time with mean \(1\), variance \(\sigma^2\), and support \([0, 2]\).

The consumer has the commitment and temptation utilities of the lecture, with \(0 < \lambda < 1/2\).

In equilibrium the consumer consumes the dividend, and the price \(p\) of the tree is constant.

  1. Use the Euler equation for the tree, \(p \, [u'(c_t) + v'(c_t)] = \delta E \{ [u'(c_{t+1}) + v'(c_{t+1}) - v'(p + d_{t+1})] (p + d_{t+1}) \}\), to show that \(p = \delta [1 + p - 2 \lambda p - \lambda p^2 - \lambda(\sigma^2 + 1)]\).

  2. Show that the gross risk-free rate satisfies \(1/(1 + r^f) = \delta [1 - \lambda (p + 1)]\).

  3. Let \(1 + r^e = (1 + p)/p\) be the expected gross return on the tree, and let \(d\) be uniformly distributed on \([0, 2]\) and \(\delta = 0.95\); compute \(p\), \(r^f\), and \(r^e - r^f\) for \(\lambda \in (0, 0.1]\), and check Gul and Pesendorfer’s formula \(r^e - r^f = \lambda \delta \sigma^2 (1 + r^f)/p\).

  4. Check the Euler equation for the tree by numerical integration over \(d\).